The French Presidency of the EU ends in a few days. This is a time key to determine the ability of the Union to be a real player in the new global situation emerging before our eyes, both the half was marked by multiple crises, starting with the Georgia and the mutation of global financial turmoil into economic crisis. It will invoke then, no doubt, the agreement of the twenty-seven on the energy-climate package, the recovery plan or the Pact on immigration. But the time is not yet in the balance sheet. It remains to ensure the delicate mission of the transition with the next two presidencies, Czech and Swedish.
The ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, Irish still stayed the course signature, is thus a major concern. The commitment of the Prime Minister of Ireland on a second referendum before November 2009 was essential but offers no guarantee of success. Therefore take care of not falling back into a new overconfidence which mortgage the outcome of the ratification.

To see the Union advance ekes out and takes his pin of the international game in this context of crisis, one is tempted to conclude that the political does not have a new Treaty to occur. But as Jean Monnet said, quoting the philosopher Amiel, "the experience of every man is again;" "only institutions become wiser: they accumulate collective experience". The political will must register in an institutional dynamic to continue in a manner that is thought out and negotiated taking into account the delicate balances on which the Union develops slowly, but since the 1950s surely. The institutional compromise from several years of discussions in a convention and widely included in the Treaty of Lisbon, which includes the creation of a post of High Representative for external relations, the extension of voting to qualified majority and codecision with the European Parliament, within this dynamic and must be preserved.
Practical issues involved in this debate on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. First the "regime" of the Treaty under which will be renewed the European Parliament and the Commission, respectively in June and November 2009.
In the best cases, i.e. that of the Irish vote scenario, the new Parliament would be elected under the regime of the Treaty of Nice and the European Commission renewed under the Treaty of Lisbon with the additional guarantee to the Ireland, the maintenance of one Commissioner per Member State.
The uncertainty that surrounds the institutional framework in which will be the new Parliament will be damaging to the credibility of the elections: uncertainty surrounding the extent of its competence and absence of the mechanism strengthened to weigh the outcome of the elections on the choice of the President of the Commission. Once more the criticism of the non-democratic functioning of the European institutions, advocated by proponents of the "no", would paradoxically prevent democratic advances. In addition, a further period of transition would be necessary to adapt the new Assembly plan of Lisbon.
But this scenario would, of course, still a lesser evil to the risk of a new Irish vote. The Union is continuing his mutation of "democracy diplomacy" and there is much to be done so that citizens have the feeling to the orientation of European policies, outside the dramatization of a referendum. Indeed, there is the European political parties to anticipate the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon in the Organization of their campaign for the European elections by deciding to nominate a candidate for the post of President of the Commission.
It will nevertheless remain open a now unavoidable debate on the maintenance of the requirement of unanimity for the ratification of the treaties in a Europe with twenty-seven or more. Because the avalanche of crises in these six months has shown that it is possible for the Union to reconcile the urgency of its action on the international scene with a mode of internal evolution that condemns inertia.